The uncanny valley hypothesis predicts that an entity appearing almost human risks eliciting cold, eerie feelings in viewers. Categorization-based stranger avoidance theory identifies the cause of this feeling as categorizing the entity into a novel category. This explanation is doubtful because stranger is not a novel category in adults; infants do not avoid strangers while the category stranger remains novel; infants old enough to fear strangers prefer photographs of strangers to those more closely resembling a familiar person; and the uncanny valley's characteristic eeriness is seldom felt when meeting strangers. We repeated our original experiment with a more realistic 3D computer model and found no support for categorization-based stranger avoidance theory. By contrast, realism inconsistency theory explains cold, eerie feelings elicited by transitions between instances of two different, mutually exclusive categories, given that at least one category is anthropomorphic: Cold, eerie feelings are caused by prediction error from perceiving some features as features of the first category and other features as features of the second category. In principle, realism inconsistency theory can explain not only negative evaluations of transitions between real and computer modeled humans but also between different vertebrate species.
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3D computer model is a distinct and familiar category
The crux of the commentators' argument is twofold. First, they claim categorization-based stranger avoidance explains our data and, thus, the uncanny valley effect. Their theory is that stranger avoidance ''is triggered when an object has an improbable appearance and is therefore categorized into a novel class" (Kawabe, Sasaki, Ihaya, & Yamada, 2017) . Second, they claim our experiment, which used stimuli varying from a person's 3D computer modeled face to a photograph, is not valid because 3D computer model is not a distinct category; like the real person in the photograph, it is just another instance of the category human being, though an instance with computer modeled features. Therefore, they conclude that our stimuli do not transition between two different categories and advise us to ''use a stimulus category dimension with a wider range containing a nonhuman entity, an ambiguous entity, and a human being."
Their argument is logically inconsistent. If our experiment did not entail a category transition (second claim) because a 3D computer model of a human being is still perceived as an instance of the category human being, there would be no ''novel class" and, hence, per their theory, no uncanny valley effect (first claim). (As they note, there was an uncanny valley effect.)
We disagree that a hand-drawn cartoon or a doll are instances of nonhuman categories while a 3D computer model and a real person are instances of the category human. (In their first experiment, Yamada, Kawabe, & Ihaya, 2013, created morphs from the face of the Charlie Brown character to the face of a Japanese man.) A 3D computer model, hand-drawn cartoon, and doll can all be used to depict humans-in which case they are all depictions within the category human.
Within the category human, in our original experiment, we instructed participants to distinguish the real from the computer animated. In the demographics survey, our US participants reported watching films, videos, and television programs with 3D computer-animated human characters 3.65 h per week on average (SD = 6.07, n = 365). They also reported playing videogames with 3D computer-animated human characters 4.54 h per week (SD = 7.54) and having played them for 7.33 years (SD = 5.96). Clearly our participants' long-term exposure should have been sufficient to establish 3D computer model as a distinct category.
In our experiment, the 3D computer model (0% real) was eeriest, which we attributed to prediction error caused by its features being perceived as features of different categories (cf. Moore, 2012; MacDorman & Chattopadhyay, 2016) ; eeriness declined as the stimuli transition to 100% real. The commentators claim their theory explains this decline because as stimuli appear more human they ''can be better categorized into a familiar class." This explanation is contradicted, however, by the fact that the 100% 3D computer model was categorized with the greatest certainty and rapidity (greater even than 100% real, figure 4 and 7, top left). This result indicates 3D computer model is a familiar category with a probable appearance, distinct from real. Further evidence is the logistic, nearly symmetrical curve with tight confidence intervals for percentage categorized as real ( figure 4, top left) . This pattern is consistent with a transition from one known category to a different known category (figure 6a of Feldman, Griffiths, & Morgan, 2009; figure 19.1 of Harnad, 1987) . In fact, if the labels were removed, it would be impossible to deduce whether the transition were from 3D computer model to real or vice versa.
Furthermore, we are concerned when the commentators write, ''stranger avoidance is not driven simply by categorization
